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Abstract
This article discusses popular explanations for the demise of farm enterprises in 
Mongolia, such as: reduced state funding, corrupt and self-interested rural elites, 
and the (supposed) drastic central privatisation policy. It argues that these factors are 
insufficient to explain the collectives’ demise, as they are largely true also for Russia, 
where no widespread break-up of farm enterprises took place. Farm enterprises in 
Russia, despite financial difficulties, show remarkable resilience as large-scale units. 
A  tendency which can be observed in general, as well as in most of the regions 
bordering Mongolia with a  similar type of (semi) – pastoralist livestock farming, 
Therefore, this article takes a look at the level of the Mongolian farm enterprise, and 
considers the socio-economic specifics of these enterprises to discover the incentives 
for employees and managers to disband (or leave) these enterprises. In doing so it 
pays attention to formal structures and informal social structures related to property 
and production, within a tentative comparison with Russia.
Keywords: Mongolia, Russia, decollectivisation, property rights, social 
institutions
Introduction
Mongolia has widely been characterised as the most ‘progressive’ or ‘drastic’ 
reformer within the former Soviet bloc (e.g. Spoor 1996), having embraced and 
strictly implemented (neo-liberal) shock therapy, as advised by international 
institutions such as the World Bank1. Within the framework of shock therapy, 
a very rapid decollectivisation of agriculture took place. Less than two years 
1 Mongolia, although not part of the Soviet Union itself, was strongly linked to it.
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after the start of privatisation in agriculture in 1990, most collective farms 
(negdel) and their successor companies had been disbanded with virtually all 
herders and other rural residents operating private family enterprises since.
As a result of rapid decollectivisation, collective services for the herders, 
such as mechanised fodder production for the herds, transportation, 
marketing, as well as social services, largely disappeared2. With such services 
in decline (or incidentally offered by  new entrepreneurs at high prices), 
rural households were forced to  operate largely on a  subsistence base. Two 
severe (dzud) winters in 1999–2000 and 2000–01 showed the vulnerability of 
household (livestock) farming without institutions providing collective (or 
public) services. During these winters six million heads of livestock were lost 
and more than 2000 herding households lost their source of income and fled 
to the towns (Griffin 2002). The enormous losses seemed largely to be caused 
by the underlying problem of a fragmented and de-mechanised pastoral sector, 
with insufficient hay reserves and collective motor pools to deliver fodder and 
move livestock in areas at risk (Sneath 2004: 173–174).
Most studies on Mongolia have focused on the consequences of 
privatisation for the livelihoods of the rural population, including topics 
such as the implications for pastoral management and its sustainability (e.g. 
Fernández-Giménez 2002; Finke 2005; Humphrey 1999; Mearns 2004; Sneath 
2004) or stratification (e.g. Fernández-Giménez 2002; Nixon and Walters 2006). 
However, the question why such drastic privatisation could occur in Mongolia 
in the first place, has hardly been addressed. Neo-liberal reformers and their 
advisors assumed that the rural population, once given the option to embark 
on their own, would massively leave the collective farms, and perceived this 
behaviour as a ‘natural’ reaction to liberalisation and privatisation. However, 
such a far- reaching decollectivisation on the ground is not at all a  ‘natural’ 
consequence of central privatisation policies. Contrary to  Mongolia, in 
Russia (as well as some other large countries of the former Soviet Union), 
despite rather aggressive privatisation policies, a tiny share of the population 
embarked on independent family farming (e.g. Allina-Pisano 2004; Spoor and 
Visser 2001). The collective farms, although formally privatised into (joint-
2 As a result of the disappearance of many services large numbers of Mongolians lost their 
jobs. The obvious solution for people was to go back to  livestock herding. People directly reliant 
on pastoralism increased from 18 per cent of the national workforce in 1989 to 50 per cent in 1998 
(Sneath 2004:162).
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stock) companies or cooperatives, have predominantly persisted as large-scale 
farms with collective labour.
Therefore, an investigation is warranted into the factors that have 
stimulated the drastic decollectivisation of collective farms in Mongolia. This 
article discusses popular explanations for this demise, such as: reduced state 
funding, corrupt and self-interested rural elites, and the (supposed) drastic 
central privatisation policy. It shows that these factors alone are insufficient 
to explain the collectives’ demise, as they are also largely true for Russia. It will 
argue that insight into the function of collectives as ‘total social institutions’ 
and pre-Soviet (informal) social structures is essential to explain it.
Regarding the theoretical underpinnings of the article, a  few concepts 
used in it need some introduction here; namely property relations and 
total social institutions. Property tends to be seen mainly as the relation of 
persons to things and in terms of formal rights, especially in the more policy 
oriented studies on property. Anthropologists of post-socialism call for 
a broader notion of property including relations between people mediated by, 
or in relation to, things (e.g. Hann 2003; Verdery 2003). As Hann (2003: 36) 
puts it ‘approaches are needed, in which the investigation of property is not 
confined to ‘private law’ notions of ownership but opens up to informal rules, 
community norms and citizenship entitlements’. Following the von Benda-
Beckmanns (et al. 2006) it is important to make a distinction between property 
at the abstract level (ideological concepts and legal regulations) and the social 
relationships (or networks) between actual people with regard to  valuables 
and the resulting practices. In the context of Mongolia this means that it is 
necessary to examine not only the formal collective property structures and 
their transformation, but also the informal social relations beneath the surface 
that regulate access to property. It should be mentioned that the dichotomy 
between formal and informal property relations (and institutions in general) 
is a theoretical one (ibid). In practice, there is a continuum between the two, 
and rural households often face complicated institutional arrangements 
(Appendini and Nuijten 2002).
When examining institutional transformation in Mongolia (and post-
socialism) it is important to  realise that collectives were not just narrow 
productive entities, but also had extensive social and welfare functions in 
relation to  the employees. The concept ‘total social institution’ as applied 
by Humphrey (1978: 141–42) to the post-socialist economy comes from Ervin 
Goffman (1962), who used it to analyse asylums and prisons in which activities of 
different spheres of life (work, leisure time) were conducted in one place under 
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one central authority. The collective farms in Mongolia and the Soviet Union 
were not just units of production, but also had extensive social and welfare 
functions in relation to  the employees. These socio-economic institutions 
provided kindergartens, nurseries, hospitals, sporting and cultural facilities, 
holiday resorts, camps, housing, education and training. The transformation 
of these collectives not only consists of a transformation of property relations 
in the sphere of production, but also has great impact on the (partly informal) 
entitlements of their members to social services. As will be shown further on, 
the range of services traditionally provided by collective farms has important 
consequences for their potential for persistence. Furthermore, it is important 
to  consider informal, social structures inherited from Soviet or even pre-
Soviet times, and their interplay with institutions, to grasp the dynamics of 
institutional transformation.
The terms agriculture and farming are used here in the broad sense, 
including livestock herding (and livestock farming in general) in addition 
to arable farming. When arable farming is meant (in Mongolia and the Russian 
regions bordering the country, it concerns mostly fodder production) this is 
explicitly mentioned. The term farm enterprise will be used to  refer to  the 
privatised successors of the collective farms in Russia and Mongolia. These 
farm enterprises have diverse legal forms, in Mongolia they have the form of 
kompani (joint-stock companies), in Russia also forms like cooperatives and 
limited liability partnerships are common. All these units have in common 
that they are corporate institutions, which are large-scale and have continued 
a  largely collective labour organisation with a  hierarchical management 
structure, strongly resembling their collective-era predecessors3.
This article will start with a brief introduction of the fieldwork sites and 
methodology. We  will follow with a  short historical overview of livestock 
management in pre-collective and collective periods in Mongolia. We  will 
describe livestock management in the collectives in more detail since this is 
important to understand the intense changes the herders experienced from 
the early 1990s onwards. We will proceed with a record of the transition from 
a  collective to  a  private livestock system (describing voucher distribution, 
the emergence and demise of companies and their functions). It should be 
noted that the article focuses mainly on the privatisation of livestock and other 
3 They should be distinguished from associations (e.g. khorshoo or khorshoolol in Mongolia), 
which are normally newly established institutions (thus not simply a continuation of old collectives 
with a new juridical status), with more egalitarian and voluntary membership (at least in theory).
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assets excluding land. This last resource is still formally largely state property 
(although not necessarily in practice) (e.g. Sarlagtay 2004; 327). We will follow 
with an analysis that tries to  explain why the rural institutions which were 
set up to  replace the collectives (the companies) largely failed throughout 
Mongolia, whereas in Russia herders (and farmers in general) still live and 
work in more or less collective systems. We will summarise our analysis of this 
process in the concluding remarks.
Locations and Methodology
Pastoral livestock production (including the herding of sheep, goats, cows, 
horses, camels and yaks) is the predominant form of agriculture in Mongolia, 
with arable farming oriented at fodder production. In Russia sedentary 
agriculture with mixed-livestock or arable farming is predominant, and the 
fieldwork we draw on in the last part of this article (by Visser in North-west 
and Southern Russia) also comes from this type of agriculture (see below).
We  contend that a  comparison with European Russia (including areas 
with arable farming) can contribute to an understanding of the privatisation 
process in Mongolia, because both countries faced a largely universal socialist 
policy that treated all kinds of agriculture and diverse agricultural zones as 
a  whole (Gray 2003; Ventsel 2005). The Soviet authorities set out to  apply 
an agro-technical model to herding, in which concentration, mechanisation 
and increased sedentariness were seen as important forms of modernisation. 
This was also true for Mongolia which largely followed the Soviet model and 
employed a  lot of Soviet specialists. Moreover, after the fall of communism, 
both countries applied shock therapy and privatisation. Within Russia, despite 
its vast size and diversity of agricultural zones, privatisation was centrally led 
with the same privatisation regulations applied virtually all over the country.
Extensive livestock production and (semi-) pastoral livestock production 
is conducted in the Russian regions bordering Mongolia (Buryatia, Tuva, 
Chita), which are part of the temperate to dry steppes and mountains of the 
Inner Asia region encompassing Mongolia, Southern Siberian Russia and 
the North of China. Furthermore, extensive livestock production (reindeer 
herding) is also the predominant form in Northern Siberia. Therefore, insights 
from Russian agriculture in general (and the research sites in North-west 
and Southern Russia), are combined with data from studies in the regions 
bordering Mongolia by Humphrey and Sneath et al (1999).
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Ethnographic field research in Mongolia was conducted by  one of 
the authors (Schoenmakers) in Ikh Bulag, a  small herding community in 
Khotont sum (county), located in the Midwest mountain-steppe zone of the 
country, from March to October 2005. The research consisted of participant 
observation and over 45 interviews. Herders, (former) farm staff and state 
officials were interviewed retrospectively about the privatisation process 
and its consequences. In addition, the article draws on studies conducted 
earlier in Khotont sum (Bruun 2006), and studies conducted elsewhere in 
Mongolia in the 1990s (e.g. Edstrom 1993; Humphrey 1999; Potkanski 1993; 
Spoor 1996).
Field research in Russia was conducted by Visser in 2001–2002 as well as 
during short field trips in 2006–2007, in the regions of Pskov (North-West) 
and Rostov (Southern Russia). It consisted of a survey of over 200 interviews, 
including workers and farm managers at 43 large farm enterprises, and 
private farmers. In addition, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
these actors as well as some officials. Both (European) Russian regions are 
characterised by sedentary agriculture.
(Pre) – Socialist Pastoral Management Institutions
In order to gain a better understanding of the current situation of Mongolia’s 
pastureland, this section presents a history of institutional change, showing 
that management strategies based on mobile pastoralism applied today have 
developed over the ages and were already in use during the rule of Chenggis 
Khan, and even earlier. The same accounts for the social structure. Reciprocal 
relations between herders that determine mutual help and access to resources 
form the basis for mobile herding. These two characteristics, mobile pastoralism 
and reciprocity, are essential to Mongolian herding and this section will show 
in what way they played a role during all institutional changes. Before going 
on to deal with the collective period, a short note on the pre-collective phase 
is in place.
The Pre-Socialist Period
A kind of feudal system arose in the period of Chenggis Khan, and continued 
under the Chinese Manchu Qing dynasty. The Manchu emperors appointed 
officials, princes and monasteries to rule the country, manage the pastures and 
divide pastureland amongst the herders (Natsagdorj 1967: 278). Mongolian 
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herdsmen were assigned to sub-districts, the sum, but could use the total area of 
the district which they where part of, for livestock herding. The land resources 
were nominally public property, with large tracts of the best of land set aside 
for the emperors’ herds (Natsagdorj 1967:270). In the sum, winter quarters 
were divided between households. Proprietary claims to winter pastures arose 
from the principle that ‘any place not occupied is mine’. When a family stayed 
at the same winter quarter for several years it automatically became the owner 
of the spot (Natsagdorj 1967: 269).
The Collective Period: Formal and informal structures
The collectives, as organised in Mongolia, were institutions that either had 
the status of a state farm or a negdel. The state farms were mainly responsible 
for agricultural experiments, crossbreeding animals and the preparation of 
fodder. The negdel predominantly conducted pastoralism.
The negdel were hierarchically organised, with a strong specialisation on 
livestock types (as well as by sex and age) between units. The negdel correlated 
with the local government level, the sum. The director of the negdel was also the 
governor of the sum. The negdel was divided into brigades (corresponding to the 
lower administrative level, the bag), each with their own leader, a veterinarian, 
a health worker and a propagandist. Each brigade in turn consisted of several 
suur, small groups of cooperating households herding and living together, 
specialised in one type of livestock (Humphrey 1978: 141–142).
On the eve of market reforms, the negdel in Khotont sum, according to the 
former vice-president counted 1,000 members (which was roughly the average 
size of a negdel), about half of them herding and half performing service jobs. 
It owned 100,000 animals and cultivated 8,000 hectares of agricultural land.
Mongolia’s central planning apparatus estimated how much food should be 
produced in one year. Based on these calculations, the negdel staff determined 
a quota for each individual herder. If herders did not produce enough, the negdel 
would withhold a share of the herder’s wage. The negdel staff were responsible 
for the management of livestock production. Formally, they decided when and 
where herdsmen had to go on transhumance and what kind of work a herder 
had to carry out. The reality was somewhat different. Firstly, in practice, the 
herders did have quite some influence on decision-making regarding pasture 
management. Secondly, although not officially, social relations among the 
herders still played a role in the rearing and management of livestock.
Although many herders complained about the lack of freedom in decision 
making, in some interviews herders stated that they did have substantial 
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influence on the daily execution of their jobs. The former vice-director of 
the negdel stated: The negdel decided where to move but asked advice from the 
herdsmen. If a  herder wanted to  move, he often told it to  the brigade leader 
and he would tell the negdel. Then the negdel would provide transport, because 
the herdsmen know the good pastures. (Dashrentsen, former vice-director of the 
negdel. This statement resounded in the interview with rank-and-file herders.
Management strategies were largely based on the methods herders used 
before collectivisation. The basic tenets of mobile pastoralism (seasonal 
migration, allocation of reserve pastures, the use of hayfields) were maintained. 
How these strategies were carried out was however very different from the 
pre-collective period, when social networks and patron-client relations were 
the basis of pasture management. During the collective period, the social 
networks that formed the basis for reciprocity lost much of their usefulness. 
Herders did work together in the suur, but who they cooperated or lived with 
in one settlement depended on decisions made by the negdel. Relations and 
norms that determined access to resources before the collective period were no 
longer needed since the negdel determined where and when the herders would 
go with their herds. This is not to say that social relations lost their function 
completely, as will be shown when private livestock is discussed. 
Private Livestock
The negdel permitted herders to own a fixed number of private animals. They 
were allowed to keep approximately fifty pieces of livestock; 35 bod (sheep and 
goats) and 15 bog (cows and horses), with which the families could support 
themselves. Herders could also make dairy products for their own use and 
were allowed to sell if they produced above the production quota. As it was 
quite complicated for a household to herd a small number of four different 
kinds, social relations were still important. A herdsman who was appointed 
to  be a  sheep herder would mix his own and his family’s sheep with the 
negdel’ s flock. His cows would be handed over to a family member who had 
to herd cows for the negdel. It was important to have good relations with other 
herdsmen so one could exchange the care for livestock (for a study stressing 
the continued importance of social relations for household production in 
Russia during the Soviet period see Miller and Heady 2003).
If a family owned more private livestock than allowed, it had to hand these 
animals over to the negdel. According to one of the herdsmen of Ikh Bulag, 
the herders used social relations to  make sure the animals would not have 
to be sent to the negdel. Some families owned less livestock than the maximum 
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allowed. When there were livestock counts, the extra animals of one family would 
be in the temporary ‘ownership’ of a family with few private animals.
In sum, social relations were used to passively oppose the system. Herders 
protected and helped each other to  keep as much private possession and 
independence as possible.
The Negdel as a Total Social Institution
Although herders sometimes loathed the negdel’s control over pastoral 
production, the support for production was mostly welcome (see also Sneath 
2004: 14). The negdel provided support for production, as well as supply and 
marketing services.
One of the things that made socialism popular and made most herders 
long back to the socialist period, were the well arranged social facilities offered 
by  the ‘total social institution’ that the negdel formed. The sum centre was 
transformed into a  mini metropolis with a  school with boarding facilities, 
a  market, a  veterinary centre, a  culture house, sports facilities, pumps and 
well houses, public baths and a kindergarten. For the first time, herders had 
secure jobs and a  stable income, just like in the Soviet Union. Education 
and healthcare were well developed. The negdel organised boarding schools 
where the children would stay all-year- round, except for busy periods like the 
harvesting season. Healthcare and hospital stays were free for all members of 
the negdel. The culture department arranged concerts and cultural events. In 
addition, travelling music groups would go out to the pastures to give concerts 
to the herdsmen.
Post-Socialist Pastoral Management Institutions
In the 1980s, it became clear that the planned economy could not persist 
without major adjustments to  the system, and in 1985 the Mongolian 
government started its own version of perestroika, including reforms in 
agriculture. A  livestock lease system was introduced by the state. Instead of 
herding livestock for the negdel, families could lease a herd of livestock from 
the negdel. Limits on the size of private herds were raised, making private 
commercial husbandry possible by 1989 (Korsun and Murell 1995: 475). The 
system only lasted a year when it was decided to dissolve the collective system. 
Nixon and Walters (2005: 1566) note that “some herders regretted that this 
intermediate system was so swiftly replaced with full privatisation”.
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The real reform rush started in 1990 when mass popular demonstrations 
called for democratisation and the first multi-party elections were held. Like 
in most of the former Soviet Union countries, Mongolia conducted ‘shock 
therapy’ to  transform the country from a  centrally planned into a  market 
oriented economy (Griffin, 2002:  2). Institutions such as the IMF and the 
World Bank proposed market reforms which consisted of price liberalisation, 
reducing state intervention and expenditure, currency convertibility and 
privatisation of public assets. In 1991, the government started a  huge 
programme to  privatise state and collective farms through the distribution 
of shares among the former farm workers. One can distinguish basically two 
categories of property that were privatised: livestock (and assets that were 
directly related to  livestock husbandry such as shelters) and other material 
assets (means of transportation and machinery). The distribution of livestock 
vouchers was as a  rule directly combined with physical distribution of the 
livestock (at least a majority of the livestock). With regard to other assets the 
initial tendency was to keep the assets in common ownership by pooling the 
vouchers (Nixon and Walters 2006: 1566).
In comparison with other former socialist countries, reforms in Mongolia 
advanced much further in the early 1990s (Spoor 1996). The general idea that 
the privatisation policy was very drastic, as mentioned earlier, is however 
not as straightforward as may seem. In reality, there were several groups 
that took opposing positions in the privatisation debate. The young, urban 
reformers advocated rapid and forced privatisation, with physical distribution 
of property, whereas the agrarian lobby envisaged a more gradual approach 
allowing (most likely, only temporary) the continuation of large collective or 
corporate units. This debate resulted in the compromise that the state only gave 
some general guidelines for privatisation with much freedom for collectives 
to choose the precise way to execute privatisation. Later on we will come back 
to this political process beyond the actual implementation of privatisation.
The privatisation of livestock was virtually completed between mid-
1991 and mid-1992 (Korsun and Murell 1995: 475), and was followed by the 
privatisation of other assets (Nixon and Walters 1995: 1567). Before the 
process, 255 negdels existed throughout the country. After the initial wave of 
privatisation, 57 negdels still existed, 40 had disbanded completely and the 
remaining 158 generated 320 new companies. The privatisation of livestock 
resulted in the rapid growth of the share of private, individually owned, 
livestock, which increased from 23% in 1990 to  80% in 1993. (Korsun and 
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Murell 1995: 475–81). Currently the number of privatised livestock is 97.8% 
(NSO Statistical Yearbook 2003: 132).
Pastoral land remained in the ownership of the state, to  be commonly 
used by the Mongolian citizens. The topic of land ownership is one that has 
been under heated discussion ever since the start of the decollectivisation 
process. The new land law of 2002 made long-term lease contracts for winter 
settlements possible, but so far, the issue of land ownership turned out to be far 
too sensitive to make strong decisions4. The topic of land privatisation would 
require an extended discussion (see e.g. Sarlagtay 2004; Sneath 2003), which is 
beyond the scope of this article.
In Khotont sum, as elsewhere, livestock and other assets were privatised 
in the form of vouchers that were distributed amongst the rural population. 
The former collective was reshaped into companies that operated on the basis 
of the sparse remains of the negdel. Former negdel members received shares in 
the new companies. The new companies were soon stripped of most of their 
supporting services and practically all companies went broke within a  few 
years. In the next section we will describe these processes in further detail.
The Process of Decollectivisation
This section will describe the (chaotic) process of property change in the 
Mongolian countryside in more detail, discussing the share (voucher) 
distribution, the establishment of companies as well as the demise of these 
companies and the functions they provided.
Special attention will be given to  the changes in the functions and 
services of the collectives during the transition. Further, the revival of 
informal structures which took place during the early 1990s, especially after 
the demise of the companies, will be discussed. After the description of the 
decollectivisation in this section, the following section will further analyse it 
(discussing several potential explanations), discussing among others the way 
decisions about privatisation were made by  the national government. Here 
we focus on the level of the farms, but it should be noted that the privatisation 
regulations were rather open. The responsibility over the privatisation of 
state assets was given to the negdels and as a consequence differed very much 
according to  locality. Furthermore, due to  lack of strict central regulations 
4 The law on land is available on the website of the Mongolian government: http://mit.mit.
pmis.gov.mn/en/download/laws/
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 11/4/16 9:38 AM
32 Oane Visser, Lotte Schoenmaker
and enforcement the privatisation process was rather chaotic. Due to  the 
chaotic and diverse nature of the privatisation it is difficult to  reconstruct 
the process precisely and make satisfactory generalisations. The conditions 
for privatisation were very unclear and most people had no clue of what was 
happening. Salaries ceased to  be paid and bookkeeping was discontinued, 
no one could really check on the process (Bruun 2006: 21). ‘Poor memories’ 
and the variety of versions told by the people make it hard to find out what 
exactly happened in this period. Therefore, the following version is necessarily 
a rough account of the reality.
Voucher Distribution
The kind of people who were eligible to  receive shares (vouchers) varied 
according to  region and negdel, but there were two broad options (Nixon 
and Walters 2006: 1566). In the first variant all inhabitants of a  sum were 
entitled to receive vouchers (thus not only negdel members but also people 
working in cooperative trades, pensioners and sometimes also officials of the 
local government). The second option, often applied in regions where the 
livestock numbers per person were low, defined cooperative members more 
narrowly as active cooperative members (sometimes excluding children and 
students).
In Khotont sum, the distribution of the negdels’ assets was based on 
a calculation of total value of the assets, divided by  the number of citizens. 
These assets were predominantly livestock and some technical assets, for 
instance, trucks. Every member received vouchers and, depending on their 
former function in the negdel, received certain assets for it. A herder received 
livestock with his voucher while a driver could obtain a truck or car. The former 
vice-director described the privatisation in Khotont as follows: We  decided 
to privatise all capital and livestock. For example, we valued all the houses, sold 
them and gave the money to our members. The livestock had to be privatised 
for 100 percent. The number of livestock each family would receive depended 
on: the number of years worked for the negdel, the number of family members, 
income during the negdel and age. All people received two types of vouchers, 
the pink voucher, with a  value of 3000 Tugruk could be exchanged for assets 
like machines, animal shelters, animals troughs, agricultural machines, furniture 
and construction materials. For the blue voucher, with a value of 7000 Tugruk, 
people would receive livestock. Accounts from herders show other ideas of what 
the vouchers entailed; blue tickets for grown ups, pink vouchers for children 
or pink vouchers for livestock and blue vouchers for shares in companies. 
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At that time many people didn’t really know what privatisation meant. They got 
the vouchers from the leader but they didn’t know the value of it (Herdsman, 
Community member, Ikh Bulag).
The Establishment and Demise of Agricultural Companies
Negdels were dissolved and new cooperatives or companies were set up 
throughout Mongolia with the remains of the negdel’s infrastructure and 
machinery. The companies were planned by  the government to  form an 
intermediate stage on the way to  full privatisation and were meant to  last 
five years (Potkanski 1993:  125). Since livestock was largely privatised, the 
companies legitimised their existence by  continuing some of the functions 
that formerly were carried out by the negdel, mostly marketing and supply of 
consumer goods. (Bruun 2006: 18). The services were no longer free of charge, 
but salaries and pensions were still supposed to  be paid to  the members. 
Products had to  be sold through the companies to  the state for fixed, low 
prices (Potkanski 1993: 125).
In Khotont, three companies were formed. This was intended to be done 
in an orderly way so that eventually everyone would get his (or her) share. Two 
companies took over all agricultural activities, all buildings and machinery 
and promised to carry out joint transportation and marketing activities for the 
herders. The third company intended to continue all herding activities (Bruun 
2006: 19). The herders could use their blue vouchers to become members and 
receive a share in the new companies. Most people became members because 
they were not so rich, there were very few animals. Only a few rich herders did 
not become members (herdswoman, Ikh Bulag).
All possessions in the new companies were principally jointly owned, 
but, as Bruun (2006:) puts it: ‘With time the director’s full control gradually 
slipped into private ownership’. Public auctions were carried out to sell all the 
companies’ assets, but very few people had the money to buy any of the assets. 
The leaders of the companies started selling items to  other companies and 
to individuals at secretly negotiated prices. In a short time most assets were 
no longer used to assist the companies (Bruun 2006). In this way, the leaders 
quickly made themselves unpopular amongst the herders.
When it became clear that there was no future for the companies, there 
was not much left to hand out to the members in return for the shares they 
invested in the companies, as the following statements from herders show: 
When the company went broke, they returned our blue vouchers and we received 
just a wooden bucket (herdswoman, Ikh Bulag).
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 11/4/16 9:38 AM
34 Oane Visser, Lotte Schoenmaker
When the company was broke the leaders basically stole our vouchers. 
We  found the vouchers in the sum library. The company paid back for the 
vouchers in some rice bags. My family received 30 bags. They also gave the 
vouchers back to the people. I still have the vouchers. I made a bureec (ger 
cover) from the bags, but it was eaten by animals because the bags were used 
to store food before.
The Demise of the Total Social Institutions in the Countryside
The newly formed companies were responsible for offering services that were 
formerly organised by the negdel, to their members; to provide winter fodder, 
veterinary support and transport facilities. In reality, however, there were 
hardly any companies that provided sufficient services and when they did, 
prices were high (Potkanski 1993: 127). With no financial support or input 
from specialists, almost all of the companies were unable to  operate in the 
insecure market economy (see e.g. Nixon and Walters 2006).
Transportation was one of the important services the negdel used to provide. 
In cases of extreme weather, herds were moved from the worst affected areas 
to  places with better conditions. Managers could use teams of trucks and 
could coordinate movements centrally. The collective also stockpiled hay that 
could be used to  feed exhausted livestock, the distribution of this hay was 
also dependent on the availability of transport (Sneath 2004:174). When the 
collective system fell apart it became very difficult to find fuel and spare parts 
for the machines.
Other services that sharply declined were veterinary services, the building 
and maintenance of wells and the marketing of produce (Nixon and Walters 
2006: 1567). With transport hardly available, the large distance to  markets 
became a problem for the herders. The companies were unable to pay a good 
price for their products. Consequently, the members started to  leave the 
companies and sell to private traders; After a while, private traders appeared that 
offered a better price for our products. For example; when the company paid 100 
T per kilo, the traders paid 200 T per kilo. As members of the companies we were 
not allowed to sell our products to others than the company. When we heard that 
the traders paid a better price, we left the companies (herdswoman, Ikh Bulag)5. 
New private traders filled up the gap partially, but insufficiently. The terms 
5  The low prices offered by the companies were partly caused by the fact that they still had 
to fulfill the obligatory deliveries to state procurement agencies against low fixed prices, at least till 
1993–1994 (see e.g. Spoor 1996: 619, 622–623).
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of trade for herders plummeted. Until now, herders sell a tiny share of their 
production and when they do, prices are very low.
Apart from the services relating to livestock herding, the social services, 
so important for the success of the collectives, suffered largely from the demise 
of the negdel. Expenditure on health services decreased by 43 per cent from 
1990 to 1992, the education budget was cut by 56 per cent (Sneath 2006: 150). 
Social security eroded. The companies mostly failed to offer this encompassing 
package of services, which the negdel provided as a total social institution, or 
socio-technical system in the terms of Sneath (2004). Therefore, they did not 
manage to keep their members attached to the companies. The deterioration 
of the production support services, the marketing and supply functions and 
the social facilities the negdel used to be responsible for has had, and still has, 
a great influence on the lives of herders.
The Revival of (Pre) Socialist Social Structures
As a result of livestock privatisation herders and the demise of the negdel the 
herders became owners of the herds, who suddenly had to plan and conduct 
the livestock herding independently. On the eve of privatisation, most 
individual herders still had the knowledge required to conduct independent 
herding. As mentioned earlier, within the system of central planning of 
production in the collectives herders had a  substantial influence on the 
herding decisions. Moreover, in the socialist era members of the collectives 
were allowed to have some private livestock which they herded independently. 
Therefore, traditional herding techniques were quickly revived in Mongolia. 
Instead of single herds, herders started to take up mixed herding, to spread 
the risk of livestock losses, as during the pre-collective period. As the various 
animals each have specific needs, the herders needed access to a larger variety 
of pastures. As a consequence of the revival of mixed herding, the need for 
cooperation between families increased.
As soon as livestock was privatised, the traditional residential unit, the 
khot-ail as the primary unit of social organisation and production, re-emerged 
(Finke 2000: 5). As in the rest of Mongolia, the families in Ikh Bulag, started 
living in khot-ail. Like before the negdel period, the families tended to share 
their camp with relatives, often close relatives.
While most herders decided to  become individual private herders 
(informally living and herding together in the khot-ail), many others decided 
to set up a new type of voluntary cooperative, which was called Khorshoo. These 
cooperatives were meant to  coordinate livestock and production marketing 
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(Potkanski 1993: 126). The Khorshoo have had varied success throughout the 
country, and in Ikh Bulag, these khorshoo did not exist at all, just as in Khvod 
sum studied by Finke (2005: 165). They have not been able to provide the same 
level of support to herders as formerly provided by the negdels.
Thus the demise of the negdel as a  coordinating institution largely left 
a vacuum. For most herders there is no institution that guarantees fodder for 
the livestock in winter, or provides trucks to move them easily from summer 
to spring camp. By the mid-1990s about 70,000 of the approximately 180,000 
herders were independent, and not organised in any local association (Spoor 
1996: 621). Herders now conduct livestock herding in much smaller units 
and miss the coordination between various groups of herders provided by the 
former negdel as well as the resources provided, although they are glad that 
they can make their own decisions
Explanations for Rapid Decollectivisation in Mongolia:  
Comparisons with Russia
In this section we explain why the companies were so unsuccessful. We will 
discuss several explanations that are often given to illustrate the companies’ 
rapid demise: one at national level; the (supposed) drastic privatisation policy, 
and one at local and regional level: the corrupt and self-interested rural elites 
in the countryside. In doing so, we will compare the situation in Mongolia 
with that in Russia, where collectives as a  rule have continued to  function 
until this day. Through a  comparison of these two situations we  will find 
that the explanations that we discuss in the first part of this section indeed 
partly explain the bankruptcy of the companies but that there are underlying 
mechanisms that have determined the course of events more fundamentally.
The Privatisation Policy
The choice of Mongolia’s central government for speedy and drastic 
privatisation within the general framework of drastic neo-liberal reform (e.g. 
rapid liberalisation of prices, and reduction of state intervention), is put forward 
by many authors as an explanation for the demise of agricultural companies 
in Mongolia (Griffin 2002, Sneath 2004). This idea seems to be so obvious that 
it is not even mentioned explicitly. The general shock therapy led to volatile 
markets and to economic decline in agriculture. However, we will argue that 
the (assumed) drastic privatisation policy chosen by a central government in 
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itself is insufficient as a factor to explain the rapid demise of the companies. 
The above mentioned argument, we contend, is incorrect for two reasons.
Firstly, we will show that the central privatisation policy was less drastic 
than is often assumed. The discussion of the political process around the 
formulation of the privatisation laws and guidelines will show that the final 
privatisation regulations were rather general and indecisive. Consequently, 
a  lot of initiative was left to  the local level. Within these rather broad 
privatisation guidelines the continued existence of the companies would have 
been possible, if not in production then certainly as enterprises providing 
supplies, production services and marketing support.
Secondly, if the central government did not force negdels to  conduct 
drastic privatisation, then the choice of actors on the local level to  do  so, 
requires explanation. The widespread idea among the reformers and Western 
advisors was that rural dwellers (whether herders or farmers), once freed 
from the restrictions of enforced collective, have a universal desire to  leave 
collectives (and their large-scale successor companies) and embark on 
private herding and/or farming (e.g. World Bank 1992). However, in reality, 
privatisation in Mongolia initially met with ‘widespread disapproval among 
the rural population who were in fear of the higher risks of a private economy’ 
(Finke 2000: 7; see also e.g. Goldstein and Beall 1994), and this was also the 
case in Russia. Interestingly, in Mongolia despite initial disapproval, drastic 
decollectivisation took place whereas in Russia, where the central government 
also embarked on a drastic privatisation policy, opposition on the ground led 
to the persistence of the farm enterprises.
However, a comparison with Mongolia’s former Soviet protector, Russia, 
will show that such a  tendency cannot be assumed. On the contrary, even 
when the central government embarks on a drastic privatisation policy rural 
populations might oppose such policies in many ways.
Formation and Implementation of the Privatisation Policy: Mongolia
In Mongolia in October 1990, a  far-reaching and innovative privatisation 
plan, designed by  a  group of young economists, was accepted by  the new 
government and announced on national television. Emphasis was put on the 
egalitarian nature of the scheme, using free privatisation vouchers to provide 
each citizen with an entitlement to an equal share of the country’s assets. In 
January 1991, the privatisation process officially commenced; the Government 
Privatisation Commission and the stock market were established. The next 
task was to draft a privatisation law, which was put into effect in May 1991. 
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The State Privatisation Commission opted for full privatisation of all negdels, 
as quickly as possible (Bruun 2006: 17). However, the Union of Agricultural 
Cooperatives (the negdel umbrella organisation) resisted this. The union 
and local officials wanted to decentralise only ownership of livestock, while 
keeping intact the supply, marketing and coordination activities of the negdels 
in the form of companies (Korsun and Murell 1995: 482). The union issued 
guidelines which stated that the organisation of the cooperative was to remain 
intact, with collectively owned property to be at least 60–70 per cent of the 
total and privatised property and individually owned property to be no more 
than 30 to  40 per cent6. These guidelines were influential but did not have 
the force of law and were ambiguous. The law stated that negdels were free 
to choose the precise way of privatisation. As a consequence, privatisation in 
a large number of localities deviated from the guidelines.
In the end, the national government largely gave the negdels control over 
their own privatisation (Korsun and Murell 1995: 475–481). There were no 
provisions for democratic representation and no provisions for the protection 
of public property (Bruun 2006: 17).
A  quite different (nearly opposite) process can be found in some other 
post-socialist countries (Spoor and Visser 2001)7. In Russia for example, 
rapid changes in policy were announced in public. In practice however, there 
was a  lot of resistance against these changes, which led to a slow process of 
privatisation even though rapid changes were intended.
Formation and Implementation of the Privatisation Policy: Russia
In Russia in the early 1990s, as in Mongolia, the urban policy makers of the 
central government chose a drastic privatisation policy. The reformers largely 
followed the blueprint for agrarian reform proposed by  the World Bank 
to all transition countries. The neo-classical reforms carried out on the basis 
of this blueprint were only supported by  the intellectual elite in the cities, 
which dominated the debate in academia, politics and the mass media. This 
6 The remaining livestock that remained in the ownership of the companies was leased to the 
herders, in return for selling an agreed quota of products to the company (Potkanski 1993: 125).
7 In most European CIS countries, the actual privatisation process was considerably slower 
than the reform policies anticipated. [Only in a couple of small countries (Armenia and Georgia) 
was the reverse true, with the privatisation process on the ground leading the formal reforms (Spoor 
and Visser 2001).
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domination was possible due to the ideological campaigning of the reformers, 
who painted large-scale farms as relics of the past or instruments of state 
suppression (‘kolkhozes as an agrogulag’), discredited opposing views as 
communist or backward and claimed the radical neo-classical reforms were 
‘a natural necessity’ or a ‘solution without alternatives’ (Kirchik 2004: 3).
The deadlines for the privatisation of agricultural collectives were tight and 
arguably even stricter than in Mongolia. However, due to widespread protests 
by lower level government officials (and farm managers) they were scaled back 
several times and deadlines were postponed endlessly. For instance, initially 
all the kolkhozes and sovkhozes had to re-register themselves by March 1992, 
but a later decree extended this deadline to January 1993 (Wegren 1998: 69). 
Further, the initial resolution, if applied strictly, would have meant the break-
up of large numbers of collectives for it required collectives (and their large-
scale successors) that were unable to pay off debts, or meet their payrolls, to be 
declared bankrupt by 1992 and liquidated. This regulation was applied in a way 
that Wegren (1998: 71) concludes was typical of the first phase of privatisation 
in the early 1990s, namely that ‘state institutions introduced radical reforms, 
that soon thereafter were moderated’ by policymakers at federal or regional 
level. Privatisation in Russia, as in for instance Ukraine, was largely cosmetic 
(Allina-Pisano 2004).
In 1994, another major attempt was made to break up Russia’s collective 
agriculture. This was, for instance, reflected in the content of some ‘analytical 
notes’ by Yeltsin’s advisors which were leaked to a newspaper. This document, 
presented in March 1994, was ‘highly ideological and was explicit in its use of 
state financial levers as a political weapon to undermine the existence of all 
farms with a collective labour organisation’ (Wegren 1998b: 112). According 
to this document, all agricultural producers using a collective form of labour 
organisation should dissolve into private family farms by the autumn of 1994. 
Those that did would be granted credits for an additional six months. Farm 
enterprises that did not disband would have all credits stopped (Wegren 1998). 
The leaking of the document caused such a  reaction that the government 
distanced itself from the document, and declared that the disbandment of 
LFEs would not be enforced. Following this debacle, the idea of an enforced 
break-up of farm enterprises was eventually shelved. The dismantling of farm 
enterprises was no longer enforced but remained an option for individual 
enterprises. Farm employees and management, as a rule, strongly disliked the 
idea of splitting up the former collective farm.
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Farm enterprises that were dismantled, were normally either very weak, 
where the measure was seen as the only option (for instance because a director 
left and nobody was willing to take over), or enterprises which were dismantled 
under pressure from the regional governments as showcases of privatisation. 
The latter to show Moscow that they were following the national reform policy.
By the end of 1993, only slightly over 1 per cent of all farm enterprises in 
Russia had been broken up (Wegren 1998: 82). Only 4 per cent had transformed 
into associations of private family farms (ibid: 82), and by 2003 this group had 
even decreased to 1 per cent of the total. Some of these associations dissolved 
into individual private farms, while others re-established themselves as farm 
enterprises (for instance as cooperatives)8. Of the about 95 per cent of farm 
enterprises that had continued as large-scale enterprises by  1993, a  third 
retained their old status as kolkhoz or sovkhoz. [In Ukraine and some other 
large former Soviet countries this figure was even higher].
In principle, individual employees or households could withdraw their 
shares to establish their own farms or lease them to private farmers, but few 
did (and still do) so in practice, which reflects how the plans for dissolving 
farm enterprises were against the wishes of the rural population.
In Russia most collectives continued to persist as large-scale agricultural 
enterprises, in spite of attempts to  stimulate smaller-scale private family 
enterprises. The question for Mongolia remains why the negdels, when 
they received full control over privatisation, chose a  far-reaching physical 
distribution of property instead of a  limited privatisation that was opted 
by their own Union? In the next sections we will try to answer this question.
Corrupt and Self-interested rural Elites?
One possible argument for the rapid demise of the collectives in Mongolia 
which can be found in the studies on Mongolia, is that corruption and self-
interest was widespread and that the open privatisation procedure consequently 
led members (especially the elite) to choose direct personal benefit (taking out 
assets) before collective interests (keeping together the companies with their 
8 In the Pskov region, where Visser did his fieldwork, of the six former collectives that 
had transformed into associations of peasant farms by 1993, at least one later re-established itself 
as a  cooperative. In articles on other Russian regions, we  came across similar cases. Humphrey 
(1999: 85) also mentions that the split-up of collectives is reversed in some places in the Russian 
province of Buryatia (which borders Mongolia).
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useful functions), leading to a demise of the companies. According to Korsun 
and Murell (1995: 478); members of cooperative farms, once they had been given 
control over the process, had a clear economic incentive to push for privatisation. 
With no laws for the protection of public property it became very easy to gain 
personally from privatisation. As soon as agricultural privatisation was in the 
hands of the rural population, the conservative politics of the rural areas took 
a back seat to personal interest (Korsun and Murell 1995: 486).
It has to be noted here that the people who gained from privatisation were 
not ‘the rural population’ as a whole, but solely the elite (the negdel management 
and officials). As one herder clarified: Almost all valuable capital was taken 
by the director and accountant and other high staff, high authorities. They took 
the big machines etc., the important things (Herdsman, Ikh Bulag Community. 
The study by Bruun (2006), conducted also in Khotont sum, stresses that it was 
the members of the rural elite who obtained most valuable assets.
Privatisation became an uncontrolled process of unequal distribution. 
Nixon and Walters speak about ‘underground’ privatisation; only a small circle 
knew the precise rules for the distribution of assets and their worth. There was 
general agreement among the rural population that this form of privatisation 
was wholly inequitable (Nixon and Walters 2006: 1567).
Corruption and self-interest of the elite is mentioned by  many authors 
(Korsun and Murrell 1995, Bruun 2006, Mearns 2004), and is mentioned 
by herders as well as some officials to explain the demise of the newly formed 
companies. In this respect, a member of the council in Khotont sum stated: 
They gave the herdsmen just animals, the herders were happy with that, so the 
two [the vice-director and accountant] divided everything together. The sum 
governor stated; The leaders of the companies kept everything for themselves. 
The herdsmen became angry about it and between 1996 and 2000 all companies 
went broke.
A comparison with Russia casts doubt on the idea that corruption and self-
interest by the elites are a major explanation for the inability of the companies 
to function. [In Russia, as mentioned earlier, the cooperatives largely remained 
in existence, despite a drastic privatisation policy].
Firstly, on a general level there is no reason to expect less corruption in 
the Russian countryside. Corruption is definitely not unknown to  Russia. 
What is more, according to the Corruption Perception Index, Russia is even 
more corrupt than Mongolia. By the end of the 1990s, Mongolia ranked 43, 
with a score of 4.3 (just above Poland and Brazil), whereas Russia ranked 82 
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with a much lower score of 2.4 (comparable with various other former Soviet 
countries such as Kazakhstan and Armenia) (Transparency International 
1999)9.
Secondly, in Russia farm managers and officials also had a clear information 
advantage vis-a-vis the population as in Mongolia and used this advantage 
to  infringe on the rights of the rural population to  the former collective 
property (see e.g. Gray 2003: 306). As Feifer states in Russia, “few landowners 
understand their legal rights. In many cases, regional and local officials have 
been able to keep land in the hands of collective-farm managers and other 
cronies” (Feifer 2003: 1).
However, in Russia such actions mostly had the aim of keeping collectives 
together, instead of taking assets out of the collectives. During fieldwork in 
the Russian regions of Pskov and Rostov, one of the authors (Visser) came 
across various cases of local authorities or farm managers who had taken away 
land from rural inhabitants illegally, to return it into state ownership or farm 
enterprise property. Other forms of property like machinery are also largely 
kept within the collectives. When managers concentrate shares in their hands, 
it is mostly to gain more power over the enterprise, not to take these shares out 
(see e.g. Nikulin 2002).
If we  assume that the farm managers behave in a  largely economically 
rational manner, this suggests that in Russia the managers of the former 
collectives consider keeping the collectives together (and maybe extract 
profits from the members through their power over the collectives) as a more 
profitable strategy. A strategy that is (in the long term) thus more profitable 
than breaking up the collectives and getting a one-time opportunity to obtain 
property. Why this is the case we will consider below.
Why did the Russian farm directors decide to keep the collectives intact, 
whereas the Mongolian collective leaders decided to dismantle the negdel and 
their successor companies to gain personal profit? In the next section we will 
discuss the underlying processes that explain why Russian farms conducted 
slow and partial privatisation, whereas Mongolia is characterised by rapid, full 
privatisation.
9 It should be noted that Mongolia’s transparency worsened in the 2000s, while its level of 
transparency is still above that of Russia, according to the corruption perception index (Transparency 
International 2010).
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The Legacy of (Pre) -Socialist Farming and its Variations
As we mentioned above, in Russia rural residents are still for the most part 
attached to  collective institutions, although the economic position of these 
institutions became dire in the 1990s. Since the 1990s, the state largely retreated 
from running and financing the farms, although, as mentioned before, some 
crucial support through regional parastatals was continued. Most rural people 
were living on subsistence production (Humphrey and Sneath 1999:  73). 
Rural residents on herding farms (Humphrey and Sneath 1999) as well as 
other farms (Visser 2009) chose to remain members of the former collectives, 
whereas in Mongolia they massively left the farm enterprises. To understand 
these choices we have to take a closer look at the implementation of collective 
farming during the socialist era. When we compare Mongolia and Russia there 
are important differences in the degree of industrialisation of agriculture as 
well as the duration of the period of collectivised agriculture.
Earlier on it was mentioned that Mongolia implemented the Soviet 
model of industrialised agriculture. However, in Russia the process of 
industrialisation, or more specific for herding: the implementation of agro-
pastoralism (Humphrey and Sneath 1999: 36), advanced much further. In 
general, the agro-industrial model consisted of strong specialisation of herds 
and the workforce, continuous enlargement of farm enterprises, mechanisation 
etcetera. This model of agro-pastoralism, as implemented in some Russian 
regions in its most extreme form (for instance in Buryatia and Chita), involved 
breed improvement, which meant the introduction of more productive 
cattle which required more input of high quality fodder. Thus collectives 
with strongly interlinked livestock and crop branches evolved. The livestock 
was kept sedentary, to  make the daily supply of fodder possible. To  ensure 
sufficient fodder, the harvesting of fodder became highly mechanised. The 
new breeds were less adapted to the harsh circumstances of Inner Asia and 
therefore required well-developed veterinary services and the construction of 
permanent shelters.
In Mongolia the implementation of the model of agro-pastoralism had 
been more limited. The main difference was that mobile pastoralism with 
mostly indigenous livestock was maintained. Fodder production became 
mechanised but was of a smaller scale, mainly focussed on produced fodder 
reserves for severe winters, as there was no need for daily feeding.
As a  consequence, in the 1990s Mongolian herders were much less 
dependent on the collectives and were capable of conducting non-mechanised 
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subsistence herding. They could obtain the relatively small amounts of 
fodder, by producing it themselves manually or sometimes buying it. Further, 
transportation by trucks was substituted by freight animals. In Russia a large 
proportion of people has non-productive occupations or is dependent on 
technology and they live in villages which rely on electricity and central 
heating (see below). They would have little idea how to set up independent 
mixed farming (Humphrey 1999: 115).
Another factor that contributed to the more rapid demise of collectives in 
Mongolia, was the shorter duration of collectivisation. Whereas collectivisation 
in agriculture in Russia started in the 1930s, in Mongolia it only took off in 
the 1950s after a failed attempt in the 1930s. As a consequence, the collective 
system was less engrained and the memory of traditional, pre-collective forms 
of pastoralism and their related social structures was more alive.
This suggests that to explain the demise of collectives, not only differences 
in policy chosen by  the Mongolian and Russian states, but also the degree 
of industrialisation and the duration of collective agriculture are factors that 
should be taken into account.
Due to  a  larger degree of sedentariness in Soviet Russia, a  much more 
extended social infrastructure developed in the central farm locations. In 
Russia with the longer period of collectivisation and sedentariness, herders 
have become highly dependent on the urban-type facilities like housing, 
running water, food shops, which were provided by the collectives. Herders 
have largely forgotten how to  conduct a  nomadic, subsistence lifestyle. 
Moreover, much larger numbers of rural residents in Russia had non-herding 
jobs. Therefore, Russian farm managers felt compelled to  continue such 
facilities, despite growing financial problems during the 1990s. Several of 
the profitable farm enterprises that Visser visited still built houses for their 
employees or maintained small processing units like bakeries and sausage 
production facilities for the benefit of their workers. Farm directors who were 
able to maintain the social infrastructure were proud of that. In some areas 
farm enterprises have even increased spending on social services (see Kalugina 
2002), and the managers of the most unprofitable enterprises are trying hard 
to maintain the most essential social services, such as running water, gas and 
schools (Visser 2005; Lohlein 2001: 10).
The social services are an additional burden for the farm enterprises in 
Russia, especially for the weaker ones. However, at the same time these social 
services form an extra factor that ties members to  the farm and thus also 
contributes to the persistence of farm enterprises.
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Continuing the social infrastructure not only had benefits for the farm 
enterprise but also for the farm directors personally, as it expands their power 
base vis-à-vis the employees. As a  director of a  strong farm enterprise in 
Nizhnii Novgorod reported: ‘I can fire people because we build houses. If I can 
offer housing, I  don’t have a  problem finding [new] workers from the area’ 
(Miller and Heady 2003: 269). In such farm enterprises, farm workers who 
lose their jobs will also lose their housing and access to other social support. 
Farm directors, have normally also continued more ad hoc, individual forms 
of support, such as helping by lending money or providing food for wedding 
celebrations and funerals (see e.g. Amelina 2002; 281; Visser 2009b). From the 
perspective of the farm directors, continuing social services can be a strategy 
to keep employees dependent on the farm enterprise10.
In Mongolia, the degree of industrialisation and sedentariness that was 
achieved during communism was more limited. Therefore, Mongolian 
herders were less dependent on the social infrastructure provided by the farm 
enterprises, and could more easily break away, when the economic situation in 
the companies worsened.
Conclusions
This article discussed popular explanations for the demise of farm enterprises 
in Mongolia, such as: reduced state funding, corrupt and self-interested rural 
elites, and the (supposed) drastic central privatisation policy. It has been argued 
that these factors are insufficient to explain the collectives’ demise, as they are 
also largely true for Russia. State funding was also considerably reduced in 
Russia, albeit somewhat less than in Mongolia and with some re-creation of state 
support through parastatals at regional level. Corruption and self-interested 
elites have also been common features of the Russian countryside, but did 
not trigger a massive demise of farm enterprises. Especially the idea that the 
demise was caused by a drastic privatisation policy, appeared to be somewhat 
too simplistic. The central regulations and guidelines in Mongolia gave the 
opportunity for rapid decollectivisation but did not enforce it. Therefore, it 
was necessary to  look at the level of the farm enterprise, and consider the 
10 Cramon-Taubadel (2002: 182), based on his experience as an agricultural consultant in 
Ukraine, states that pensioners who did not rent their land shares to  the farm enterprise at the 
offered price risked losing access to social services.
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socio-economic specifics of these enterprises, to  discover the incentives for 
employees and managers to disband (or leave) these enterprises. In doing so 
we paid attention to formal structures and informal social structures related 
to property and production, following the von Benda-Beckmanns (et al. 2006).
Firstly, the difference in the formal structure of the farm enterprises (the 
extent of industrialisation as well as, related to  that, their social functions) 
had a great impact on the incentives of the employees. It caused Mongolian 
managers to choose the full privatisation option and their Russian counterparts 
to remain largely in position. The Mongolian managers were not able to keep the 
former collectives together because they could not exert enough control over 
the herders to tie them to the farm enterprises. With no finance or expertise 
to provide the services and no social functions, the management could offer 
the herders no incentives to stay. For the Russian managers, however, it was 
valuable to keep their positions, since they did have control over the herders 
and thus were able to  extract value from the herders. For the majority of 
Russian farm employees starting their own independent private farms was not 
a viable option. This is most clearly shown by the earlier mentioned tendency, 
that some Russian farm enterprises, which were split up initially, were later re-
established11. Furthermore, instead of a split-up of the farm enterprise, there is 
a tendency for further enlargement of farm enterprises into super-large farms 
or agro-holdings in Russia since the early 2000s (see e.g. Nikulin 2002; Serova 
2007), with growing foreign investment in such super-large farms (Visser and 
Spoor 2011)12.
Secondly, the differences in informal social structures had a strong impact 
on incentives for rural dwellers in Mongolia and Russia. It was shown in 
the beginning of this article that, within the formal structure of collectives, 
Mongolian herders had quite some influence on decision-making, and also 
11 Moreover, large numbers of farm enterprises which initially converted into joint-stock 
companies or limited liability partnerships, in the course of the 1990s and early 2000s changed 
into agricultural production cooperatives, an organisational form (without tradable shares), which 
much more resembles the Soviet era collectives (Bezlepkhina 2004: 19). In Chukotka region, 
the regional administration even persuaded directors of collective enterprises to  sign over their 
enterprises to municipal property, once again to be centrally managed by  the district authorities 
(Gray 2003: 313).
12 As Serova states: ‘These firms are … much bigger than the traditional Soviet farm enterprises 
and their current heirs.… There is still no clear understanding or even definition of this new phenomenon 
in Russian agriculture, but it has grown rapidly in the last decade and now plays a significant role in the 
agri-food sector’.
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operated their private livestock. For Mongolian herders it turned out to  be 
much easier to return to traditional social structures, like the residential and 
production unit the khot-ail, since the collective period was much shorter than 
in Russia. For the Russian herders traditional herding systems were something 
of a  much more distant past, as they had lived in the collective system for 
much longer. In the European Russian countryside as a rule the memory of 
the pre-Soviet situation is no longer alive (see also e.g. Gray 2003; 304). In 
Siberia, many farm enterprises returned to  the pre-Soviet, indigenous form 
of obshchina (a communal, rural institution) (see e.g. Hann 2003; Stammler 
and Ventsel 2003). This pre-Soviet institution was also formally recognised 
as a legal organisational form in the early 1990s. Often the conversion into an 
obshchina was largely formal and/or ideological (and a vehicle for indigenous 
communities to obtain subsidies directed at minorities), without any changes 
in size, organisation or management.
Moreover, pre-socialist social structures related to individual herding were 
more substantially eroded in Russia due to the larger degree of industrialisation 
and concentration. The more profound industrialisation meant that labour 
organisation was based far more on education and specialisation than on 
kinship relations. The Soviet policy to  concentrate herders in town-like 
settlements, with some of the collectives experiencing resettlements of villagers 
due to numerous rounds of farm mergers, most likely also eroded traditional 
social relations (see e.g. Fondahl 1998)13.
The majority of farm employees interviewed by Visser in the Rostov and 
Pskov regions indicated that social relations had further eroded during the 
economic hardships of the 1990s (Visser 2005). Nearly 40 per cent of the 
180 surveyed farm employees mentioned a decline in participation in village 
festivities (and 16 per cent an increase), 81 per cent mentioned a worsening 
of relations between villagers (and only 1 per cent an increase)14. In addition, 
O’Brien et al. (2000) found that support comes increasingly from a small circle 
of people and Rodionova (2003: 14) speaks about ‘a weakening of traditional 
social links, lack of mutual trust’ in rural Russia.
13 Some anthropologists argue that within the collectives, the moral economy of the pre-
socialist community was preserved in certain fundamental ways (Hann 2003: 14), that there was 
quite some informal help (Miller and Heady 2003) or that the great rupture only came with market 
reform (Anderson 1998 cited in Hann 2003). Nevertheless, it is clear that pre-Soviet social relations 
were more eroded in Russia than in Mongolia (see e.g. Humphrey and Sneath 1999).
14 Further, 20 and 54 per cent indicated a decline in networks for household plot help and 
money lending respectively (and 10 and 15 per cent an increase).
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 11/4/16 9:38 AM
48 Oane Visser, Lotte Schoenmaker
Thus in Mongolia the lower degree of agro-industrialism/pastoralism, 
and the possibility of a  return to pre-socialist informal social structures, as 
a renewed basis for production and access to resources, stimulated a transition 
to  independent household farms. However, this has been at a  high cost, as 
machinery is standing idle (partly because of high fuel costs but also because 
the current farms are too small to use it efficiently) (Sneath 2004), and farm 
offices, storages and processing units have fallen into disrepair. Griffin (2002) 
has used the term agricultural involution, developed by  Geertz (1963), 
to  describe the agricultural development in Mongolia since the demise of 
communism. After the demise of the collectives the absorption of labour has 
increased and, with a parallel de-mechanisation, the productivity of labour has 
declined (Griffin 2002: 3). In Russia, some de-mechanisation also took place, 
but with the large-scale farm enterprises still functioning to some extent, this 
was less pronounced.
On the positive side, social structures together with the use of old patterns 
of mobile pastoralism enable styles of herding that are environmentally 
more sustainable than in neighbouring regions in Russia (Humphrey 1999), 
although with increasing concentration of herders around the towns and 
subsequent local overgrazing (Griffin 2002).
Furthermore, the traditional social structures in Mongolia form a kind of 
social safety net to survive in the uncertain economy. In Russia, rural dwellers 
still experience and value the protection of large-scale farm enterprises. With 
increasing tendencies to  farm enlargement and economic recovery since 
the early 2000s, farm enterprises will remain a dominant feature of Russian 
agriculture. However, the general recovery hides the fact that, contrary 
to  the 1990s when hardly any unprofitable farm enterprises went bankrupt, 
in the years 2000, increasing numbers of weak farm enterprises are going 
bankrupt due to more strict bankruptcy regulations. As Russian members of 
farm enterprises are much more dependent on them, their demise, although 
less common than in Mongolia in the 1990s, will have much more negative 
consequences for the members.
Finally, there is a point about rural institutional transformation, we want 
to stress based on not only the differences, but also similarities between both 
countries. While the creation of new institutions appeared more cumbersome 
than many reformers and advisors reckoned, informal relations from the Soviet 
and pre-Soviet period appeared to be more resilient than they had expected. 
Indeed, as anthropologists of rural post-socialist transformation have observed 
in a wide number of countries, such as Uzbekistan (Kandiyoti 2002), Romania 
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(Verdery 2003) or Russia (Humphrey 1998), informal relations came more 
to  the fore when the formal collective structures broke down or weakened. 
In post-socialist Mongolia, household farming (with the patterns of mobile 
pastoralism), in the Soviet era conducted informally within the collectives, 
became the main form of agriculture (as collective institutions broke down). 
While pre-Soviet social structures like the khotail, and patterns of mixed 
herding were reinvented from scratch, based on memory. In Russia, household 
farming became more prominent, but remained tied to the collective farms.
While such social relations are a sufficient base for local, subsistence based 
agriculture, the case of Mongolia suggests that they provide an insufficient 
basis for wider institutions such as for the coordination of pastoralism beyond 
a  khotail, or marketing of produce (see e.g. Potkanski 1993; Sneath 2003; 
Schoenmakers 2006). New associations for marketing or coordination of 
pasture use lack clearly established and accepted hierarchies and, even more 
important, the social functions which were characteristic of the collectives.
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